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In Harm’s Way: The Limits to 
Legislating Criminal Law 
Roslyn J. Levine, Q.C.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After years of reference to the “harm principle”, the Supreme Court 
found the issue of the principle’s proper role in the section 7 Charter 
analysis squarely before it. The question appeared directly in the mari-
juana cases (R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine;)1 and indirectly in the 
“spanking” case (Canadian Foundation for Children Youth and the Law 
v. Canada).2 This paper analyzes the decisions in those cases and their 
effect on Parliament’s discretion to carry out its functions. This discus-
sion also questions whether the Court’s continued reliance on aspects of 
the harm principle really leaves any meaningful legislative scope to 
advance positive community or collective values, other than those em-
bodied in the Charter rights themselves. 
II. HISTORY OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE IN CANADIAN LAW 
Our penchant for esoteric statistics about the Supreme Court’s work 
reveals that the political philosopher most often quoted by the Court is 
John Stuart Mill.3 Mill’s fundamental ideas about the breadth of indi-
vidual liberty and the limits of state intrusion are the source of most of 
the Court’s references. These ideas centre on what is now known as the 
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“harm principle”. In his essay On Liberty, Mill outlined the classic 
statement of the principle: 
The object of the Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as 
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the 
individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means 
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral 
coercion of public opinion. The principle is the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection… The 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even 
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning 
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling 
him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify 
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be 
calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the 
conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body 
and mind, the individual is sovereign. [Emphasis added.]4 
In the context of modern law, and Charter cases in particular, the 
principles that define the limits of individual liberty equally define the 
limits of government legislative capacity. The logical expectation is that 
increased reliance on J.S. Mill’s principle will diminish the state’s legis-
lative discretion. That general trend is borne out by the Supreme Court’s 
decisions since 1992, although the Court’s attachment to Mill’s ideals 
has been somewhat erratic. A clear divide among the justices emerged 
about the role of the “harm principle” in Charter development and the 
extent to which public morals or similar values could continue to justify 
impugned legislation.  
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The harm principle has fostered classic academic works5 along with 
raging debates between its loyal defenders and committed detractors.6 
Ideas about the principle’s soundness or value, as an organizing princi-
ple for the competing interests of individual autonomy and state regula-
tion, continue to fill journal pages almost 150 years after Mill’s original 
essay. The detractors have strongly criticized the principle’s disregard of 
collective life and its essential inability to function as an appropriate test 
for subtle and complex circumstances; even its proponents have admit-
ted its imperfection. The history of the principle lies entirely outside of 
modern constitutional law.7 Nonetheless, it became a valued feature of 
our Supreme Court’s analysis of the section 7 Charter right to “life, 
liberty and the security of the person”. 
The first mention of the harm principle was the dissent of Wilson J. 
in R. v. Jones,8 where she adopted Mill’s premise. However, Wilson J. 
was not as unequivocal as Mill in applying the principle: 
Of course, this freedom is not untrammeled. We do not live in splendid 
isolation. We live in communities with other people. Collectivity 
necessarily circumscribes individuality and the more complex and 
sophisticated the collective structures become, the greater the threat to 
individual liberty in the sense protected by s. 7. 
Justice Sopinka, for the majority, in R. v. Butler,9 dealing with pornog-
raphy, expressed the first notion of the harm principle’s real importance 
for Canadian constitutional law: 
The objective of maintaining conventional standards of propriety, 
independently of any harm to society, is no longer justified in light of the 
values of individual liberty which underlie the Charter.  
The majority decision in Butler accepted that the protection of “societal 
harm” came within Mill’s concept of “harm to others”. The significant 
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point in the decision was the adoption of the Millian philosophy that only 
harm to others could justify the infringement of personal liberty.  
Up to that point, moral values had been accepted in the mix of po-
tential justification for infringement of Charter rights. In Reference re 
ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.),10 the majority 
found that ridding city streets of the “social nuisance” of solicitation by 
prostitutes was a valid objective that justified infringing freedom of 
expression. This was consistent with the earlier statement in R. v. Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd., by Dickson J., as he then was: 
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his 
beliefs or his conscience.11 
Justice Gonthier dissented in Butler, holding firm in his own opinion 
that moral values could continue to validate criminal legislative action: 
Indeed the problem is not so much to assess whether morality is a valid 
objective under the Charter as to determine under which conditions it is a 
pressing and substantial objective. Not all moral claims will be sufficient 
to warrant an override of Charter rights. 
… 
First of all, the moral claims must be grounded. They must involve 
concrete problems such as life, harm, well-being, to name a few, and not 
merely differences of opinion or of taste. Parliament cannot restrict 
Charter rights simply on the basis of dislike; this is what is meant by the 
expression “substantial and pressing” concern.12 
Justice Gonthier’s dissent in Butler is not surprising as, in the period 
since that decision, he continued to strengthen his support for moral or 
other values as justification for state intrusion on individual rights. He 
recognized that social well-being is sacrificed by the primacy of indi-
vidual liberty and remained wary of the limitations that the Millian 
approach places on legislative discretion that serves the collective inter-
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est. As referenced later in detail, he argued for a legal model that would 
encompass and nurture broader social values at the expense of some 
individual liberty. 
After Butler, three points became clear. First, the Supreme Court 
and the Courts of Appeal moved increasingly toward a form of Charter 
analysis that required a legislative objective of harm prevention to jus-
tify infringements of Charter rights. Second, the “harm principle” be-
came increasingly important in both the “fundamental justice” analysis 
in section 7 and the balancing approach in section 1. Finally, it became 
gradually more difficult for governments to justify legislation because 
evidentiary proof, even of a reasonable apprehension of harm, was usu-
ally problematic. Discerning when scientific proof would be necessary 
and when common sense might be adequate to satisfy the burden be-
came a job better suited to psychics than lawyers. 
Certainly, part of the harm principle’s early appeal was its rejection 
of morality as justification for state interference in private individual 
action. However, morality, as understood by Gonthier J. and others, also 
claims a broader sense, encompassing community values that aim to 
improve the community’s sense of well-being. Public litter probably 
causes little or no direct harm, but it is reasonable to assume that a clean 
environment is almost universally preferred. In the same vein, attempt-
ing to achieve a society that is free of psychoactive drugs is a laudable 
goal with collective benefits of well-being, even conceding that the 
individual use of such drugs does no harm in the Millian sense. 
As Wilson J. pointed out in R. v. Jones, the community or collectiv-
ity — the counterbalance to individuality — is placed at risk if the justi-
fication analyses under the Charter become overly saturated by the harm 
principle to the exclusion of value and even moral based justifications.  
While individual liberty is protected against the conventional or ma-
joritarian opinion, the majority must perpetually endure the activity it 
may detest almost universally. Some will always argue that the price 
paid by the collective is appropriate to the value of the freedom it brings 
to the individual, but the reality is that the collective pays the price, 
nonetheless, by holding its collective nose forever. (In this regard, the 
huge increase in both the amount and pervasiveness of pornographic 
matter is a perfect example.)  
The important point is, when the harm principle is applied as the ex-
clusive rule to mediate the tension between individual liberty and consti-
tutionally-permissible limits of legislative action, the inevitable result is 
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a social environment that operates only at the lowest common denomi-
nator of intolerance for widely abhorred activity. If the intent of the 
Charter was to create that social state, then it may still achieve its goal 
in spite of the most recent cases that appear to disavow the strict harm 
principle. 
Less than a year after the Butler decision, with its clear endorsement 
of Mill’s ideals, the Supreme Court appeared to waver for a moment, in 
Rodriguez,13 where the criminal prohibition against assisted suicide was 
challenged under section 7 but upheld. Justice Sopinka, for the majority, 
seemed to recant the Court’s distaste for moral justification of liberty 
infringement. Mill’s exception for the protection of vulnerable groups 
could have provided a consistent rationale for the decision, as the vul-
nerability of the disabled was at issue. However, the clear focus of the 
Rodriguez judgment was aimed in a more contradictory direction. 
Justice Sopinka laboured to find the required factors to contextual-
ize and discern the principles of fundamental justice that might be vio-
lated. He deemed the consensus of societal opinion important to 
ascertaining principles of fundamental justice and then identified the 
“sanctity of life” — perhaps the quintessential moral-laden concept — 
as the principle of fundamental justice engaged in the circumstances. 
Justice Sopinka acknowledged the moral nature of the issue and negated 
both Mill’s contempt for public opinion and his principle that each per-
son is the guardian of his or her own bodily and spiritual health:  
 I wholeheartedly agree with the Chief Justice that in dealing with this 
“contentious” and “morally laden” issue, Parliament must be accorded 
some flexibility. … In light of the significant support for the type of 
legislation under attack in this case and the contentious and complex 
nature of the issues, I find that the government had a reasonable basis for 
concluding that it had complied with the requirement of minimum 
impairment.14 
In this sense, the judgment reflected the dissent of Gonthier J. in 
Butler, where public opinion or support for a measure along with moral-
ity are tied to the meaning of harm in the justification process: 
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S.C.C.A. No. 108. 
14  Id., at 614-15. 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) In Harm’s Way 201 
 
[A] consensus must exist among the population on these claims. They 
must attract the support of more than a simple majority of people. In a 
pluralistic society like ours, many different conceptions of the good are 
held by various segments of the population. The guarantees of s. 2 of the 
Charter protect this pluralistic diversity. However, if the holders of these 
different conceptions agree that some conduct is not good, then the respect 
for pluralism that underlies s. 2 of the Charter becomes less 
insurmountable an objection to State action…In this sense a wide 
consensus among holders of different conceptions of the good is necessary 
before the State can intervene in the name of morality. This is also 
comprised in the phrase “pressing and substantial”.  
 The avoidance of harm caused to society through attitudinal changes 
certainly qualifies as a “fundamental conception of morality”. After all, 
one of the chief aspirations of morality is the avoidance of harm. It is well 
grounded, since the harm takes the form of violations of the principles of 
human equality and dignity. Obscene materials debase sexuality. They 
lead to the humiliation of women, and sometimes to violence against 
them. This is more than just a matter of taste.15 
The majority judgment in Butler also departed from the admonition of 
Lamer J. in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, that “the principles of funda-
mental justice” are found in “the basic tenets of our legal system”, and 
“do not lie in the realm of general public policy”.16  
Although a constitutional challenge was not in issue in R. v. Hin-
chey,17 some support for moral values was evident again when 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. defined the scope of the criminal law by reference to 
Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law: 
In fact, the harm caused, while one element to be considered, is only one 
element. Indeed in some crimes such as conspiracy or attempt, no harm at 
all may actually materialize… 
Criminal law is premised on the belief that there are some acts that ought 
to be prevented and on the belief that a criminal process is the best way to 
achieve this…18 
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16  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 
503, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73. 
17  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128, at 1144, para. 26, [1996] S.C.J. No. 121. 
18  A.W. Mewett, and M. Manning, Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law, 3rd ed. 
(Markham: Butterworths, 1994), at 16-17. 
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In 1998, in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General),19 
Bastarache J. held that the government had not succeeded in establishing 
the harm it intended to avoid by the imposition of a three day blackout 
period for the publication of poll results prior to an election. He held that 
the object of preventing the possibility that some voters might be misled 
by inaccurate polls was pressing and substantial. Nonetheless, the gov-
ernment had not proven that the harm it sought to prevent was widespread 
or significant. The Court found that where common sense dictated the 
harm was slight, the government was entitled to little deference. 
Justice Gonthier dissented in Thomson Newspapers, once again and 
stated: 
 The Charter should not become an impediment to social and 
democratic progress. It should not be made to serve substantial 
commercial interests in publishing opinion poll results, by defeating a 
reasonable attempt by Parliament to allay potential distortion of voter 
choice.20 
Justice Gonthier’s continuing message about collective responsibil-
ity is found, not surprisingly, in his ideas about the legislative function: 
Democratic institutions are meant to let us all share in the responsibility 
for these difficult choices. Thus, as courts review the results of 
legislature’s deliberations, particularly with respect to the protection of 
vulnerable groups, they must be mindful of the legislature’s representative 
function.21 
In 2002, the Sauvé case became the ensuing battleground for the 
role of social and moral values in the constitutional review of legisla-
tion. The Chief Justice was categorical in eliminating social policies 
from the justification discussion, relying exclusively on harm, where the 
Election Act removed penitentiary prisoners’ right to vote.  
                                                                                                                                
19  [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, [1998] S.C.J. No. 44. 
20  Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at 
908, para. 30, [1998] S.C.J. No. 44. 
21  Id., at para. 42. 
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Demonstrable justification requires that the objective clearly reveal the 
harm that the government hopes to remedy, and that this objective remain 
constant throughout the justification process.22 
No harm was identified. The government characterized the object of the 
legislation as a positive measure towards improving prisoners’ views of 
social responsibility and the rule of law. The majority could not accom-
modate any legislative deference where the object of the disenfran-
chisement was “the enhancement of civic responsibility” through a 
value-laden message about the consequences of anti-social (criminal) 
conduct. Not only did the Court give short shrift to legislative deference, 
it also trounced the “dialogue theory” that had provided a notional 
framework for the relationship between the judicial and legislative 
branches of government. In the result, legislative discretion to imple-
ment positive social values, in the absence of objective harm, was virtu-
ally removed. 
Here, again, Gonthier J. wrote the dissenting opinion, but also on 
behalf of three other justices. First, he determined that morality is not 
banned from the process of justification: 
 In my view, the real challenge is not justifying state activity on the 
basis of morality in the abstract, but determining which specific moral 
claims are sufficient to warrant consideration in determining the extent of 
Charter rights…  
 The issue is therefore identifying what amounts to a fundamental 
enough conception of morality.23 
Justice Gonthier also recognized that scientific proof had become 
the inevitable requirement to satisfy the harm test (which, for example, 
is the reason the government failed in its justification efforts in Thomson 
Newspapers). He understood that considerations in the justification 
process might not be capable of “scientific proof”.  
[T]he harm which flows from serious offenders voting is obviously not 
empirically demonstrable. As long as one holds democracy to be an 
                                                                                                                                
22  Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 23, [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 23. 
23  Id., at para. 113. 
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abstract good, to find that empirically measurable harm flows from the 
result of any fair democratic process is an impossible argument to make.24 
Most importantly, the minority opinion recognized that values out-
side those embodied in Charter rights, such as the promotion of the rule 
of law, might be fundamentally important and provide adequate justifi-
cation to limit individual rights or freedoms.25 
Despite the Supreme Court’s overall trend of increasing restriction 
on the scope of legislation where the harm principle is not served, the 
Court appeared to soften its position in the most recent cases. That ap-
pearance, however, belies the reality. In spite of the Court’s rejection of 
the classic Mill principle as “a principle of fundamental justice”, for the 
purpose of section 7, the Court is likely to continue invalidating legisla-
tion unless it meets a harm threshold. The marijuana and spanking cases 
engaged two very different but complementary issues relating to Par-
liament’s constitutional scope to create criminal offences. In R. v. 
Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine and R. v. Clay26 the Court considered the 
validity of criminal sanctions for the private recreational use of mari-
juana. In Canadian Foundation for Children Youth and the Law v. Can-
ada — the “spanking case” — the Court determined the validity of the 
criminal defence for parents who use reasonable corrective force, i.e., 
spanking, on their children. 
The criminal law requires special consideration in the discussion of 
liberty interests and the harm principle. As seen in Malmo-Levine and 
Caine, imprisonment and subjection to the criminal law process and 
conviction engage serious deprivations of the section 7 liberty right. The 
fundamental point about the limits of criminal law were stated by Dick-
son C.J. in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act: 
A law that has the potential to convict a person who has not really done 
anything wrong offends the principles of fundamental justice and, if 
imprisonment is available as a penalty, such a law then violates a person’s 
right to liberty under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.27 
                                                                                                                                
24  Id., at para. 179. 
25  Id. at paras. 114-15. 
26  [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, 2003 SCC 75; R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 
S.C.R. 571 [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine and Caine”] 
27  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), supra, note 16, at 492. 
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This principle of fundamental justice begs the question for the pre-
sent discussion, as it fails to determine what qualifies as a constitution-
ally valid “wrong”. Can a contravention of legislation, which aims 
simply to promote or significantly increase social well-being, constitute 
a “wrong”? Whether an activity can constitute a “wrong”, without proof 
of its harm to another or to society, remains the issue. 
Both the majority and minority opinions in Malmo-Levine and 
Caine agreed that Parliament is entitled to complete deference on the 
wisdom of criminalizing any particular behaviour.28 That deference is 
limited only by constitutional rights. For Arbour J., however, imprison-
ment is the controlling consideration that limits legislative discretion 
immediately, apart from the necessity to meet the principles against 
arbitrariness, rationality and gross disproportionality.29 
III. THE MARIJUANA CASES 
With respect to recreational marijuana use, the challengers in Clay, 
and Malmo-Levine and Caine invoked Mill’s harm principle as an inde-
pendent principle of fundamental justice. They asked the Court to strike 
the marijuana laws on the basis that a criminal sanction for an activity 
that did not harm anyone, except (possibly) the marijuana user, violated 
the user’s section 7 liberty (or privacy) rights. (The argument in Clay 
emphasized the privacy aspect of marijuana use in the section 7 right, 
claiming that “not an insignificant” amount of harm is necessary to 
validate the prohibition.) The consensus of the evidence in the cases was 
that a small percentage of persons are vulnerable to the effects of mari-
juana and could harm themselves, while chronic use could harm most 
individuals’ health. 
The question for the Court, clearly stated, was whether the govern-
ment could criminalize any behaviour that does not meet the harm prin-
ciple — as a principle of fundamental justice — within the meaning of 
section 7. The context, which was pivotal to the Court’s decision, was 
the criminal nature of the intervention, the possible sanction of impris-
onment and the usual sanction of a lesser punishment. At the outset, the 
                                                                                                                                
28  R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 215, per Arbour J.; at 
para. 173, per McLachlin C.J.. 
29  Id., at para. 69, per Arbour J. 
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Chief Justice, for the majority, distinguished J.S. Mill’s philosophical 
exercise from constitutional interpretation. Further, the Court acknowl-
edged the overly simple nature of Mill’s formulation.30  
The first blow to a formal role for the harm principle in section 7 
was the finding that it was an “important state interest” rather than a 
normative “legal” principle. Consequently, the principle failed the B.C. 
Motor Vehicle and Rodriguez threshold test that determines what is a 
principle of fundamental justice. The Court also found that the principle 
suffered from a lack of “significant societal consensus” or “general 
acceptance among reasonable peoples”. The Court’s own experience 
with the principle could have been sufficient proof, although the Court 
cited diverse sources, from Mill’s critics to the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada.31 The Commission had tackled the question of what the 
objective or limits of criminal law should be, stating that it should be 
reserved for “conduct that is seriously harmful” but: 
... [harm] may be caused or threatened to the collective safety or integrity 
of society through the infliction of direct damage or the undermining of 
what the Law Reform Commission terms fundamental or essential values 
— those values or interests necessary for social life to be carried on, or for 
the maintenance of the kind of society cherished by Canadians. 32 
The majority of the Court dispensed with any distinction between 
criminalizing acts of harm to self and harm to others.33 But Arbour J.’s 
view was that legislation could not remain constitutional when it threat-
ened imprisonment of the vulnerable for their own self-protection. The 
evidence that imprisonment for the relevant offences has been used only 
in exceptional circumstances appeared to be a key factor in the major-
ity’s decision to uphold the legislation. The majority determined the 
threat of imprisonment was not unconstitutional, as individual sentences 
would remain susceptible to constitutional scrutiny.34  
Most significantly, the Court determined that the harm principle 
“does not provide a manageable standard under which to review the 
criminal or other laws under s. 7 of the Charter”. But, the Court’s defer-
                                                                                                                                
30  Id., at para. 109, per McLachlin C.J. 
31  Id., at paras. 115-22. 
32  Id., at para. 122 [emphasis added by Court]. 
33  Id., at para. 124. 
34  Id., at paras. 148-49. 
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ence to Parliament to designate activity as criminal, in order to promote 
other state interests (i.e., other values), is illusory, as illustrated by the 
following: 
Parliament, we think, is entitled to act under the criminal law power in the 
protection of legitimate state interests other than the avoidance of harm to 
others subject to Charter limits such as the rules against arbitrariness, 
irrationality and gross disproportionality…35 
In other words, failure to establish harm beyond a de minimis stan-
dard for a criminal legislative action likely would result in a violation of 
section 7 on the grounds of arbitrariness, irrationality and gross dispro-
portionality. In the case of marijuana use, the severity of problems for 
some people, like the vulnerable, was enough to satisfy an attack based 
on arbitrariness. However, society’s collective disapproval of the use of 
psychoactive drugs apparently would not have sufficed.36 
In Clay, Gonthier and Binnie JJ., for the majority, stated that “[t]he 
task of the Court … is not to micromanage Parliament’s creation or 
continuance of prohibitions backed by penalties” neither is its concern 
“with the wisdom of the prohibition”.37 This separation of function will 
be difficult to heed, however, even without a formal constitutional 
“harm principle”. Legislative discretion under section 7 remains limited 
by the notion of disproportionality, which calculates whether the legisla-
tive measures used are “so extreme that they are per se disproportionate 
to any legitimate government interest”.38  
In Clay, legislative “overbreadth” was claimed and the Court found 
that this aspect was also governed by the standard of “gross dispropor-
tionality”.39 The connection to harm avoidance is maintained under this 
test, although not articulated in that way, as the court must measure the 
positive contribution or effect of the legislation (i.e., its effectiveness in 
harm avoidance) in proportion to its adverse affects on section 7 liberty 
interests of the individual.  
                                                                                                                                
35  Id., at para. 129. 
36  Id., at para. 136. 
37  R. v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, at para. 4. 
38  R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, supra, note 28, at para. 143, per Mclachlin C.J. 
[emphasis in original]. 
39  Id., at para. 38. 
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[I]f the use of the criminal law were shown by the appellants to be grossly 
disproportionate in its effects on accused persons, when considered in 
light of the objective of protecting them from the harm caused by 
marihuana use, the prohibition would be contrary to fundamental justice 
and s. 7 of the Charter.40 
Although the onus is on the claimant and the threshold is high in this 
respect, assertions about a provision’s positive contribution may be 
incapable of any scientific proof necessary to rebut the allegations of a 
breach of fundamental justice.  
The Court also examined the spectre of a criminal conviction and a 
record for the impugned offence in relation to the test of gross dispro-
portionality. Once again, the avoidance of harm figured prominently in 
supporting the prohibition’s validity. The Court showed deference to 
Parliament’s policy choice in employing the criminal justice system to 
enforce the prohibition. Nevertheless, failure of the disproportionality 
test under section 7 would have rendered meaningless the initial defer-
ence. The legislation passed the test only on harm-based considerations: 
Once it is determined that Parliament acted pursuant to a valid state 
interest in attempting to suppress the use for recreational purposes of a 
particular psychoactive drug, and given the findings of harm flowing from 
marihuana use, already discussed, we do not think that the consequences 
in this case trigger a finding of gross disproportionality.41 
While the harm principle failed to find a unique or independent 
function in the section 7 analysis, the decisions in the marijuana cases 
remain replete with “harm speak”. The Court’s section 7 analysis made 
little real room for state interests that comprise pure, positive state ac-
tion to improve social well-being, rather than support the reduction of 
apprehended harm. Parliamentary deference in the creation of the crimi-
nal law is endorsed, but social values of fundamental importance, by 
themselves, will not pass section 7 Charter scrutiny under principles of 
arbitrariness, rationality and disproportionality, unless some harm is 
avoided. The only reasonable conclusion from the decisions in Malmo-
Levine and Caine is that the harm principle may be outwardly invisible, 
but it still stalks the Charter’s liberty right. 
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IV.  THE SPANKING CASE 
In Malmo-Levine and Caine the Court allowed that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, Parliament could decide what is not criminal as well 
as what is.42 In the spanking case, which was argued prior to the deci-
sion in Malmo-Levine, the Foundation for Children Youth and the Law 
attempted to enforce a constitutional corollary to the principles in the 
latter case: the state must intervene where there is at least an apprehen-
sion of harm. For the majority of the Court, the section 15 equality right 
answered the challenge completely. Justice Arbour addressed the sec-
tion 7 argument and found that section 43 breached a child’s right to 
liberty and security. 
The Foundation challenged the defence contained in section 43 of 
the Criminal Code, which exempts parents (and teachers) from criminal 
conviction for assault (section 265) if they use “reasonable force in the 
circumstances” for correction of a child. The Foundation based its chal-
lenge on children’s section 15 equality right but also, more importantly 
for this discussion, on a child’s section 7 liberty interest (to be free from 
physical force). The Foundation invoked the harm principle, although to 
a different end. It argued that the government is required to take positive 
action to create a criminal offence (by removing a defence) where the 
activity in issue is harmful.  
The consensus of the evidence in the spanking case was that some 
types of corrective force may be harmful, depending on the age of the 
child and where on a child’s body the force is applied. The government 
argued that any potentially harmful acts lay outside the scope of the 
defence, when interpreted in accordance with the Constitution. The 
Foundation’s evidence never established that children are harmed by a 
parent’s disciplinary use of mild to moderate, normative force, such as 
“spanking”. By contrast, the evidence did establish that employing the 
criminal process in a family setting, to address the trivial assault in-
volved in a spanking, would be harmful to the family as a collective 
unit. 
In theory, the spanking case provided a test for the exception to 
Mill’s principle, as the matter concerned the rights of children — a 
vulnerable group. 
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Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must 
be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury.43  
The Attorney General did not argue that physical discipline is necessary 
to protect children against their baser nature or to foster their proper 
development, although some persons traditionally hold the contrary 
view. The Court did not consider this aspect of the principle. 
The case rested on the perspective of the victim in the criminal jus-
tice system and the victim’s liberty interests. In effect, the circumstances 
created the photographic negative of the harm principle, arguing for 
state intervention in the presence of harm. Was this approach entitled to 
succeed? The victim’s liberty interests in relation to the state’s action 
are indirect at best. The state’s failure to criminalize the acts of others is 
not the source of the intrusion on the victim’s liberty. The Foundation’s 
theory placed a positive obligation on the state to protect the victim’s 
liberty interest. The argument might have invoked the Millian exception 
for the vulnerable as a legislative imperative. The case was not decided 
on that basis, however, since the majority interpreted section 43 as not 
extending to force that results in harm or a prospect of harm.44 Nonethe-
less, the risks of harm and arbitrariness were addressed by the Court in 
the context of the appropriate use of criminal sanctions. The majority 
noted that the presence of the section 43 defence avoids more harm than 
it might cause: 
But s. 43 also ensures the criminal law will not be used where the force is 
part of a genuine effort to educate the child, poses no reasonable risk of 
harm that is more than transitory and trifling, and is reasonable under the 
circumstances. Introducing the criminal law into children’s families and 
educational environments in such circumstances would harm children 
more than help them. So Parliament has decided not to do so, preferring 
the approach of educating parents against physical discipline. 
… 
Yet, as emphasized, the force permitted is limited and must be set against 
the reality of a child’s mother or father being charged and pulled into the 
criminal justice system, with its attendant rupture of the family setting, or 
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a teacher being detained pending bail, with the inevitable harm to the 
child’s crucial educative setting. Section 43 is not arbitrarily demeaning.45 
Justice Arbour, for her own minority opinion, addressed the child’s 
section 7 rights and determined that the defence of de minimis would 
satisfy all concerns about the inappropriate use of criminal sanctions for 
non-harmful parental actions. In resurrecting this defence, Arbour J. 
referred to her opinion in Malmo-Levine, which resolved that there is no 
culpability for harmless and blameless conduct.46 This principle was 
originally intended to protect the traditional section 7 interests of the 
accused — in the case of section 43, the parents who might be charged 
with a criminal offence. The application of that principle to vindicate the 
section 7 liberty interests of victims is problematic for the harm princi-
ple, as it engages competing harms. (The majority held that it was more 
harmful to criminalize mild parental force than to allow a parent to use 
that force.) Moreover, if the defence were removed, both the victims and 
the accused would need to rely heavily on police and prosecutorial dis-
cretion, which are simply other varieties of state intrusion (by commis-
sion or omission) for the parents and children on either side of the 
disciplinary force. 
Justice Arbour’s judgment also provided her view of the proper 
roles for courts and legislatures in creating criminal offences. She re-
fused to read constitutional limits into the defence as the majority did, to 
avoid its application to harmful actions, because when a defence is di-
minished, criminal culpability is expanded.47 In her opinion, Parliament 
can create offences and the courts may narrow them or remove them 
when they breach constitutional limits. However, courts are not entitled 
to enlarge or create criminal law. In philosophical terms, the courts 
cannot assist the State’s intrusion upon the liberty of the individual, but 
only protect against it. This view applies Mill’s theory in its original and 
pure form. 
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V.  THE HARM PRINCIPLE — WHY NOT 
The Supreme Court was right to reject the harm principle as an in-
dependent principle of fundamental justice for reasons other than those 
stated in the marijuana cases. Section 7 requires an internal balance of 
individual liberty rights and state interests to determine the relevant 
principles of fundamental justice,48 aside from the balance in section 1. 
As a principle of fundamental justice, the harm principle would perma-
nently predispose the section 7 balance in favour of the individual’s 
interest, significantly changing the content of the section 7 right. As the 
Court reiterated in Malmo-Levine and Caine, the onus in establishing 
the section 7 breach must be borne by the claimant. Injecting the harm 
principle into the section 7 right would reverse the burden at the outset. 
The government would have to establish proof of harm in every section 
7 case, whether or not it had some other valid justification at the section 
1 stage.  
Further, the harm principle is a rigid idea that is inconsistent with 
broader Canadian ideals supported elsewhere in the Charter. Modern 
governments are remarkably more sophisticated than they were at the 
principle’s inception. Their approach to regulation is multi-layered and 
varied. Most importantly, governments must execute their craft within 
constitutionally-entrenched limits. The original harm principle was 
aimed simply to limit government action against the individual and was 
articulated at a time when society was homogenous and government had 
unfettered legislative discretion. Some factions in modern society wel-
come, if not demand, government action for their protection and to me-
diate between the disparate social interests of a diverse modern society. 
The challenge in the spanking case makes this point exactly. 
As Epstein explains, the modern concerns of discrimination, vic-
timization and marginalization were “not even remote specters in Mill’s 
moral or descriptive universe”.49 Our own Court has coalesced ideas 
about human dignity and avoidance of degrading or dehumanizing ac-
tivity into the underlying themes or policies of a number of different 
Charter rights. These ideas, too, were not part of the language of the 
harm principle’s original formulation; the principle requires a real 
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stretch to accommodate them. In the Keegstra case,50 the Court upheld 
the criminal offence of inciting hatred by the narrowest margin. The 
majority thought it was necessary to find that harm avoidance was the 
pressing and substantial objective to justify the offence. The simple, but 
fundamentally important, objective of promoting social harmony in a 
diverse society would not have been sufficient. The harm principle re-
spects autonomy,51 but does not necessarily honour human dignity. 
Epstein also notes that the harm principle is based on individual 
transactions or occurrences, an approach that has little resonance in a 
modern world of great social interaction, where a multiplicity of other 
interests is engaged by individual actions. Additionally, the principle 
was never designed to handle mass social organizations, such as labour 
unions or trusts, and does not provide any guidance to measure or value 
numerous competing interests. 
Justice Gonthier captured many features of these concerns and the 
harm principle’s discordance with modern societal values through a 
slightly different discussion. According to his theory, we have over-
looked the principle of “fraternity” while concentrating on “liberty” and 
“equality”.52 Justice Gonthier asks what happened to the concept of 
fraternity in North America. He postulates that the omission constitutes 
the triumph of individualism over communalism. He defines fraternity 
in the following terms: 
It is the glue that binds liberty and equality to a civil society. It is intuitive. 
It is the forging element of a community. It advances goals of fairness and 
equity, trust and security, and brings an element of compassion and 
dedication to the goals of liberty and equality… Whereas liberty protects 
the right to live free from interference, fraternity advances the goals of 
commitment and responsibility, of making positive steps in the 
community… Further, the goal of fraternity is to work together to achieve 
the highest quality of individual existence. In short, liberty and equality 
depend on fraternity to flourish.53 
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Likewise, the harm principle denies any place in law for the values that 
underpin ideals such as fraternity. It robs the individual of the benefits 
of communalism by addressing only those detrimental aspects of com-
munity that limit individual liberty. The values of the collective are 
described by Gonthier J. as follows: 
The constituent elements of fraternity are a number of values which, like 
liberty and equality, are fundamentally moral values, values to which we 
aspire but seldom attain. Each of the values interacts with liberty and 
equality while also interacting with the other fraternal values. The result of 
this process, or the result to which we aspire, is a better community.54 
The possibility of an improved community can never be addressed di-
rectly by the legislator under the scrutiny of the harm principle. The 
principle, by itself, is not elastic enough to validate positive legislative 
steps aimed simply at advancing greater social well-being.  
As the Supreme Court noted in Malmo-Levine and Caine, recent 
academic thinking also concludes that the harm principle has collapsed 
under its own weight.55 Bernard Harcourt documents the shift in justifi-
cation of legislative intervention from morality to harm, in circum-
stances that would have been precluded by the harm principle thirty 
years ago.56 He sees today’s debate between autonomy and state intru-
sion “as a cacophony of competing harm arguments without any way to 
resolve them” because “the original harm principle was never equipped 
to determine the relative importance of harms”.57  
Richard Epstein also points to this trend. He argues that while the 
principle itself is essentially the same, “far more content has been 
poured into the exception ‘harm or evil to others”, to justify all manner 
of government intervention.58 We see this effect in the efforts to craft 
policy statements in the language of harm to support the passage of 
legislation. We also see the huge evidentiary records and the witness 
contests in constitutional litigation — all aimed to prove or disprove 
harm. In the spanking case, almost 20 volumes of affidavit evidence and 
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cross-examination transcripts were produced to support or debunk the 
allegations of harm from physical punishment. The huge amounts of 
time and resources required to litigate harm have changed the constitu-
tional litigation landscape. 
In Epstein’s view, the result of this shift in focus is the application 
of the principle as a sword against individual liberty rather than a shield 
to protect it. From the legislator’s view, however, this transformation 
places a huge burden and resulting chill on legislative capacity and 
creativity. The government must abdicate any proactive role in improv-
ing social conditions since it is nearly impossible to provide the proper 
evidentiary case for harm that is merely apprehended or anticipated. 
In Harcourt’s view, the collapse of the harm principle is beneficial, 
because it highlights the harm that is usually present on both sides of the 
equation and requires balancing. As the Court pointed out in the mari-
juana cases, the parties busied themselves with either proving harm 
from the intrusion and the harm from prohibited activity, with neither 
side giving much credence to the other’s harms. However, the ineffec-
tiveness of the harm principle is also more apparent, because it does not 
provide any guidance on balancing the competing harms. The spanking 
case provided a case in point on this account as well. While the potential 
for harm to a child exists in the use of physical disciplinary force, the 
Court validated the defence partly because it found more potential harm 
for the family and society in criminalizing trifling parental actions. 
While the concerns about the harm principle and its restraints of leg-
islative capacity have an abstract quality, the Assisted Human Reproduc-
tion Act59 supplies a reality check. This very recent legislation prohibits 
human cloning and mandates serious criminal sanctions for its contra-
vention. Ten-year terms of imprisonment, in addition to fines up to 
$500,000, may be imposed. The questions around cloning are ethical 
and moral. The legislators, as representatives of our collective interest, 
have a sense that a ban on cloning is necessary for greater social well-
being and the preservation of human dignity. The legislative objective 
relates to ideas about the sanctity of life. If the section 7 rights of the 
Act’s offenders are prima facie violated, because moral values alone 
(without proof of harm) cannot surmount the existing principles of fun-
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damental justice, the government loses the benefit of its interest in the 
section 7 right and its section 1 burden is automatically engaged. If the 
reasoning in Sauvé governs the section 1 analysis (rather than the earlier 
reasoning in Rodriguez), the section 1 analysis to justify the cloning 
prohibition based on “other values” and moral grounds may be doomed 
as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Canadian experience with the classic harm principle advocated 
by Mill is inconsistent. At the outset of its Charter analysis, the Supreme 
Court’s alternating dismissal and embrace of moral values as justifica-
tion for limitations on personal liberty left the scope of legislative defer-
ence in limbo. By increasing its adherence to the harm principle, the 
Court narrowed the limits of legislative discretion and removed the 
opportunity to foster collective ideas of social improvement. While the 
Court has finally determined that the harm principle is not a principle of 
fundamental justice against which the section 7 liberty right is meas-
ured, the principle remains a live part of the existing fundamental prin-
ciples against arbitrariness, irrationality and gross proportionality. 
The critiques offered by numerous authors should renew the ques-
tion of the necessity of referring to the principle at all, since it falls so 
short on many accounts. If the criticisms of the harm principle are le-
gitimate, then the principle should have no greater utility as a standard 
in its subordinate role in section 7 than it would have as an independent 
principle of fundamental justice. Although it seems that the Supreme 
Court has dealt conclusively with the harm principle in the marijuana 
cases, the decisions forewarn that discussions about the principle will 
continue for some time. 
